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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

vs.

:

ALLEN BOYD MILLER,

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Case No. 860475
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order and judgment of
conviction for the offense of production of a controlled substance, a

third

degree

felony,

in

violation

of

Utah

Code

Annotated, §58-37-8(1)(a )(i) (Supp. 1985), in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Judith Billings
presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COTJH|T
Appellant was charged by Information with the offense
of Production of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(1)(a)(i) (Supp.
1985).

On February 6, 1986, a suppression hearing was held before

the district court, at which time appellant made a motion to
suppress certain evidence obtained pursuant to a search of his
residence.
was tried

The district court denied the motion and the case
before the court without a jury on June 19, 1986.

The case went to trial upon stipulated
8 ) , with the only

facts (State's Exhibit

issue to be decided by the court

the identification of the plant material seized.

involving

The district

court, in a memorandum decision dated July 1, 1986, found that
the State had shown that the plant material was marijuana and
judgment of conviction against appellant was entered on August
28, 1986.

On September 12, 1986, appellant filed a notice of

appeal with this court,
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order

from

this court

reversing

the trial court's order denying appellant's motion to suppress,
reversing the

judgment

and

conviction

rendered

against

him,

and remanding this case to the third district court for a new
trial, or in the alternative, an order to the district court
that the case be dismissed.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the affidavit filed in support of the search

warrant fail to establish probable cause, thereby requiring the
suppression of all evidence seized pursuant thereto?
2.

Did

the

supporting

affidavit

contain

false

or

misleading statements, which, when removed from the affidavit,
leave insufficient

evidence upon which

to establish

probable

cause?
3.

Is the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary

rule, as set forth in United States v. Leon and Utah Code Annotated §77-35-12(g),

inapplicable

and/or

inappropriate

in the

present situation?
4.

Did the facts set forth in the supporting affidavit

2

justify or require a "no knock" search warrant?
5.

Did the State, through its expert witnesses, prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance seized was actually
marijuana?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant, on

or

about August

7889 South 3850 West, West Jordan, Utah.
warrant

1, 1985, resided

at

On that date a search

(a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2) was

issued authorizing

the police to search appellant's residence

and all structures and vehicles located on the property.
warrant was based upon an affidavit

(a copy of which is attached

hereto as Exhibit 1) filed by Detective Stewart Smith.
affidavit, Officer

Smith

testified

The

that

the

In the

following

facts

were true and correct:
(a)

Certain

of Miller's neighbors complained about

"unusual traffic" in the neighborhood;
(b)

Officer

Smith

observed

and photographed

three

storage sheds, two swamp coolers which blew cool air
into boarded up windows, a furnace and accompanying
vent stacks, and

a series of

lights placed

upon a

swamp cooler;
(c)

Certain

unidentified

neighbors

have

observed

Miller mixing up peat moss on his premises;
(d)

Some cars were seen leaving Miller's house after

a short stay early in the morning;
(e)

One of the cars seen in the morning hours belonged

3

to Ma known drug user";
(f)

On an undisclosed number of occasions, a U-Haul

truck has

been parked

identified neighbors

by Miller's house
have

heard

being

which unloaded

and

unloaded at night;
(g)

Unidentified

neighbors

have

not

seen

Miller's

garage door open;
(h)

Unidentified neighbors have seen two large dogs

with Miller;
(i)

Miller's power bills are higher than normal and

he pays the bills without protest;
(j)

Miller "has prior illegal possession charges for

possession of

psilicybin

mushrooms,

1/4

pound

and

possession of marijuana";
(k)

Franklin Spain, who has been arrested for posses-

sion of marijuana in the last year, resides at Miller's
house;
(1)

Credit reports given to the power company show

Miller to

be

self

employed

and

doing

Miller's Auto

Body

Shops,

which

did

business
not

seem

as
to

exist.
(Exhibit 1 ) .
After listing these facts, Officer Smith concluded that
each item observed

around appellant's home could possibly

be

used to cultivate marijuana or other possible illegal substances.
(Exhibit 1)

After

approximately

4

six

weeks

of

surveillance,

Officer Smith confirmed the unidentified neighbors' reports of
the presence of the above listed property items.
Officer Smith

further testified

"no knock" warrant.

that these

facts

(Exhibit 1 ) .
justified a

Based upon the foregoing, the magistrate

found that there was probable cause to believe that there were
marijuana plants

and

illegal

mushrooms

on

the

appellant's

premises.
Upon executing
items which

they

claimed

property allegedly
stances.

the

used

Appellant

warrant,

were

police

marijuana

a motion

to

several

plants and

in the production

made

seized

personal

of controlled

suppress

the

sub-

evidence

seized and a suppression hearing was held in the district court
on February 6, 1986.

At the hearing, appellant called Officer

Smith and questioned

him as

to the

statements contained

in

affidavit.

cohabitation of
testified that
residence during

appellant
he

never

the
and

veracity

Franklin

observed

the six weeks

Mr.

As

of

the

factual

to

the

alleged

Spain, Officer
Spain

surveillance

at

Smith

appellant's

period.

Officer

Smith based his conclusory statement upon an address given by
Mr.

Spain when he was arrested over a year before the affidavit

was prepared.

(Tr.

9,

10)1

A S to

his

statement

affidavit that one of the cars visiting appellant's

in

the

residence

was registered to a "known drug user", Officer Smith testified
that he

was

referring

to a Vann

Larson.

(Tr. 10)

Officer

1. "Tr." refers to the transcript of the suppression hearing
held on February 6, 1985.
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Smith concluded that Vann Larson was a "known drug user" because
he had previously
paraphernalia.

been

arrested

(Tr. 10 f 11)

for possession

of

However, Officer Smith admitted

that he knew that those same charges against Mr.
been dismissed.

(Tr. 11)

narcotics

Larson had

Officer Smith admitted that he had

never seen Vann Larson use drugs.

(Tr. 11)

With regard to the

U-Haul truck parked by appellant's house, Officer Smith testified
that he never saw the truck filled with marijuana or any other
illegal substance.

(Tr. 11)

Mr. Smith only saw soil additives

and conditioners stacked around the truck.
After hearing

Officer

Smith's

(Tr. 12)
testimony,

the

court

denied appellant's motion to suppress and the evidence seized
was introduced at his trial.
Appellant was tried before the court without a jury
on June 19, 1986.

A written stipulation was presented to and

received by the court which, in substance, provided that the only
issue to be resolved by the court was whether the state had shown,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the substance confiscated was in
fact "marijuana".

At trial, appellant

renewed his motion to

suppress pursuant to State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (1983), which
was denied.

(R. 252)

At trial, the State presented three witnesses, Officer
Smith, the

affiant,

Kevin

Smith

and

Robert

Brinkman,

both

criminalists for the State of Utah.
Officer Smith testified that he has attended certain
instructional courses and worked in narcotics for the past two

6

years.

(R. 216)

Officer Smith concluded that the plants which

were seized at appellant's address were marijuana because, when
he executed the warrant, he could smell what he believed to be
marijuana (R. 219), and the plant material had

"leafy" green

leaves, with an odd number of petals on the serrated leaves.
(R. 221)

On cross examination, Officer Smith admitted that the

drug related

courses

which

he

has

attended

dealt

investigation, not substance identification.

with drug

(R. 223)

Kevin Smith, a criminalist, after relating his qualifications and experience, testified that he examined the seized
substance microscopically
Duquenois-Levine test.
concluded that

the

(R.

229)

and

subjected

it

to

a

Based upon these two! tests, Mr. Smith

substance

was

marijuan^.

(R.

230)

On

cross examination, Mr. Smith admitted that he has never taken
any courses in botany.

(R. 235)

Mr. Smith testified that there

were certain types of hairs present on the plants which led him
to conclude that they were marijuana.

(R. 234) However, these

same hairs can be

found

(R. 235, 261)

to the Duquenois-Levine

As

on over a hundred different plants.
test, which

is a

chemical analysis, Mr. Smith testified that other substances or
chemicals could
239)

possibly

However, Mr. Smith

see whether

any

such

react

similarly

to marijuana.

only visually checked

reactants

were

located

(R.

the plants to
on

the plants.

(R. 239)
In his defense, appellant called Dr. Dwight Fullerton,
who is a professor at Oregon State University College of Pharmacy

7

and who

specializes

in plant

identification.

(R.

254 f

255)

Dr. Fullerton testified that marijuana does not have a unique
physical appearance

and that many plants have serrated

and an odd number of petals on the leaves.

(R. 257, 258)

to the two types of hairs relied upon by Kevin Smith
visual examination, Dr. Fullerton

testified

plants possessed

of

262)

some

combination

edges

that

As

in his

hundreds of

those hairs.

(R. 261,

With regard to the Duquenois-Levine test, Dr. Fullerton

stated that many plants could yield a result similar to that of
marijuana.

(R.

265)

Dr.

Fullerton

opined

that

if he

were

presented with the evidence produced by the State, i.e., that the
plant looked

like marijuana, that microscopically

it had two

certain types of hairs which are present on marijuana as well as
many other plants, and that the plant tested positive under the
Duquenois-Levine test, he would

not be able to state

with a

reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the substance was
marijuana.

(R. 268, 269)

After hearing the testimony of Robert Brinkman, a state
criminalist, as to the industry standards adoped by the State,
the court found that the substance in question was marijuana and
convicted him as charged.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The arguments in the brief will proceed as follows:
First:

Under both state and federal law, the facts

and circumstances set forth in the supporting affidavit fail to
establish the probable cause necessary to justify the issuance

8

of the search warrant.

The affidavit simply contains innocuous

facts, which are as consistent with innocent activity as with
criminal conduct,

and

unsupported

conclusions

which

do

not

support a finding of probable cause.
Second:

The supporting affidavit contains false

statements which were made knowingly or with reckless disregard
for the truth.

When these false

statements are removed from

the affidavit, the remaining material does not establish probable
cause.

Should the court find that the affidavit is otherwise

sufficient under federal law, then the court should take this
opportunity to interpret the state constitution so as to prohibit
the type of police misconduct present in this case.
Third:

When the court finds that probable cause was

not established, the evidence seized is not otherwise admissible
under the Utah Code or under the Leon "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule.
and material

The affiant's intentional misstatements

ommissions

render

any

"good

faith"

exception

inapplicable and inappropriate.
Fourth:

The Utah Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act is

unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions
because it places a greater burden upon a defendant than that
required by the United States Supreme Court in Leon.
Fifth:
not justify

the

The facts and circumstances of this case do
issuance

of

execution of such a warrant

a

"no-knock"

warrant

and

the

in this case violates the Fourth

Amendment.

9

Sixth:
reasonable doubtf

At trial, the state failed to prove, beyond a
that

the material

residence was in fact marijuana.

seized

from

appellant's

The two tests employed by the

state criminalist were not unique to marijuana and hundreds of
plants yield results similar to that of marijuana.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SET FORTH IN
THE AFFIDAVIT FAIL TO ESTABLISH THE PROBABLE
CAUSE NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF
THE SEARCH WARRANT UNDER BOTH STATE AND
FEDERAL LAW.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, and papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrant shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution also requires
that warrants
cause.

shall

issue

In connection

only

upon

a

showing

of

probable

with the issuance of a search warrant,

there must be probable cause to believe that an item is located
in a certain place at a particular time.
Freeman, 685 F.2d

See, United States v.

942, 948 (5th Cir. 1982).

Whether probable

cause exists in any given situation is a question of fact to be
determined by applying

an objective test.

The United

States

Supreme Court, in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949),

10

articulated this test as follows:
Probable cause exists where facts arid
circumstances within theirf the arresting
officers 1 f knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information, are
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed by
the person to be arrested,
IQ. at 175.
One factor to be considered
cause determination

in making this probable

is whether or not the police have actual

knowledge that a crime has in fact been committed.
the present

Whenf as in

situation, the police possess no knowledge as to

the actual commission of a crime, a greater quantum of proof is
required to establish probable cause.

For example, in State v.

Frazier, 421 A.2d 546 (1980), the court stated:
One of the most important elements in
determining whether probable cause existed
is satisfied when police know a crime has
actually been committed. In many cases the
police do not know that a crime has been
committed. When the arrest or search is
made when the police do not know that a
crime has been committed, more and better
evidence is needed to prove that probable
cause exists for the [search] than is the
case when police do know that a crime has
been committed.
Id_. at 550.
(jemphasis
added)
Another factor to be considered is the source of the
information set
present case,

forth

the

in

affiant

unidentified citizens
Illinois v. Gates, 462

the

supporting

received

supposedly
U.S.

213

affidavit.

certain

living

information

near

(1983),

the

Supreme

(1964) and

v. United States, 393

which

11

(1969),

in

the
from

appellant.

rejected Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
U.S. 410

In

In

Court

Spinelli

combination

held thatf when an affiant officer receives information from an
informant, the

affidavit

must

contain

facts

sufficient

to

establish the basis of the informant's knowledge and the informant's veracity
Upton, 466

U.S.

or

reliability.

727

(1984).

See also, Massachusetts v.

Instead, the

Supreme

Court

in

Gates adopted a "totality of the circumstances" test to be used
in deciding whether an informant's tip provided probable cause
upon which to base a search warrant.

The Gates court defined

this test as follows:
Whether given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before [the magistrate] , including the 'veracity' and 'basis
of knowledge1 of persons supplying information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place. And the duty
of a reviewing court is simply to ensure
that the magistrate has a substantial basis
for . . . concluding that probable cause
existed. I6_. at 219. (emphasis added)
The Utah
P.2d 1099

(Utah

Supreme

Court,

1985), abandoned

in

State v. Anderson,

the Aguilar - Spinelli

701
test

and followed Gates.

See also, State v. Espinoza, 39 Utah Adv.

Rep. 23 (Utah 1986).

In adopting Gates, the Utah Supreme Court

stated:
Nevertheless, in State v. Bailey, [675 P.2d
1203 (1984)], we observed that even under
the Gates "totality of the circumstances"
standard, compliance with the AguilarSpinelli guidelines might be necessary to
establish the requisite "fair probability"
that the evidence sought actually exists
and can be found where the informant so
states. R K at 1101.
In his concurring opinion in Anderson, Justice Stewart stated:

12

The basis of the affiant's knowledge must
be set forth in the affidavit together with
some evidence supporting the veracity of
the informant when the affidavit includes
allegations of a confidential informant.
Without such a foundation, a warrant becomes
a mere charade, and the basic liberty
protected by the Fourth Amendment would
constitute an unenforceable right, or, more
realistically stated, no right at all. Id.
at 1104. (emphasis added)
At this point, it is important to note exactly what
facts comprise the "totality of the circumstances" upon which
the warrant was based in the present situation.

The affidavit

submitted by Officer Smith cites various pieces of information
obtained from
alleged to

be

confidential,
private

unidentified

citizens

and

informants, who are

neighbors

of

appellant.

However, none of the information provided pointed to any type of
criminal activity or behavior.

For example, "neighbors" provided

the police with the following information:
(a) There is unusual traffic in the
neighborhood of "the suspect premises";
(b) Occupants of the residence were observed mixing peat moss, with two large dogs
with them;
(c) A U-Haul trailer parked near the house
was heard being loaded and unloaded late at
night;
(d) "Neighbors" have never seen the garage
door open; and
(e) Allen Miller acts secretive when
observed around the premises.
The affidavit does
who allegedly

not provide the names of the "neighbors",

observed

these

innocent

events,

nor

does

it

contain an approximate date on which any of the observations

13

were made or related

to the affiant.

In fact, there are no

dates given as to any of the information provided.
no facts alleged
Miller who

was

to show how
the person

the neighbors knew

acting

"secretive".

There are
it was Mr.

There

is no

information as to how many times the U-Haul truck was observed,
or how many "neighbors" supposedly heard the loading and unloading take place.
Notwithstanding this lack of detail, even more
important is the fact that the "neighbors" are not identified
in the affidavit

nor

informants addressed.

is the reliability
In a

similar

or veracity

situation,

the

of the

court

in

People v. Fatman, 406 N.Ed.2d 619 (1980) noted:
"The State cannot merely by stating that
their informant is a citizen informant,
establish that fact. Supporting facts must
be presented which support the conclusion
that the informant is a private citizen."
Id. at 623.
In the affidavit, Officer Smith states that he considers the
information received from the "confidential informants" reliable
because:
"Neighbors are private citizens whose
reports have been observed and verified by
affiant and photographed. Your affiant has
verified the above information to be current
and accurate through the following independent investigation: Continuous surveillance
from June 14, 1985, to August 1, 1985, in
which traffic survey and photographic
surveillance, and background investigation
confirmed the neighbors reports." ( Exhibit
• "

1

.

)

Affiant's claim that the neighbors' reports have been verified
is supposedly

supported

by

the
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following

statements

in

the

affidavit:
(1) A traffic survey of the area identified
several cars.
The several cars came and
went from the premises in the early morning
hours. They would remain only a short
time.
(2) A U-Haul truck has been located at the
rear of the garage on numerous occasions.
(3) A furnace like apparatus was in the
garage area and the windows were boarded
up.
(4) A "traffic survey" of "the area" observed several automobilesf for which ownership records identified a known drug user
coming and going from the premises in the
early morining hours. Those vehicles
remained for a short period of time.
The following

factual

allegations

set

forth

in the

affidavit were allegedly ascertained as a result of the police
investigation which began on June 14 f 1985:
A. Information from Utah Power and Light
showed that the electrical service lines
coming into the residence were three times
the size normally required for a residence
of a similar size.
B. Monthly power consumptionf according to
Utah Power and Light, was four to five
times the normal amount of usage.
C. According to Utah Power and Light, the
monthly bill was paid without objection.
The account was in the name Allen B. Miller.
D. The "suspect", Allen B. Miller, has
prior illegal possession charges for 1/4
pound of psilacybin mushrooms, and possession of marijuana.
E. Franklin David Spain, of the same
address, had been arrested for possession
of marijuana in the last year.
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F. Credit reports show suspect Miller selfemployed with Miller's Auto Body Shop which
does not "seem to exist".
Suspect truck
observed at residence never has tools in
it.
(Exhibit 1)

Following the narration set forth abovef the af-

fiant added this conclusory statement:
Affiant, a trained narcotics officer knows
that peat moss is used for growing marijuana
and mushrooms and has observed numerous
stacks of plastic buckets at the residence,
knows that furnaces can be used to dry
plants for usage, and that swamp coolers
can vent and humidify plants being grown in
a basement as at suspects premises. Large
electrical consumption would be used to
facilitate grow lights and drying equipment;
and the truck used to load shipments for
periodic distribution or final cultivation
of plants at another growing site.
(Exhibit 1)
The factual deficiencies are clearly evident from the
face of the affidavit.

There are no facts alleged to show that

the Allen B. Miller, who had an account with Utah Power & Light
Co., is the same person who is alleged to have had prior drug
possession charges.

There

is

no

evidence

to establish

the

basis for the affiant's conclusion that Franklin Spain lived at
the residence with Miller.

There is no identification of the

credit report referred to and relied upon for the information in
paragraph (F) above.

Although

the affiant

stated

that peat

moss was used for growing marijuana and mushrooms, there is no
allegation that

the

investigation.

There

observed the

police
is

no

saw

any

peat

allegation

moss

that

during

the police

"furnace-like apparatus" in operation.

their
ever

Finally,

there is no relevance noted as to the observation of "stacks of
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white buckets" at the residence, or as to who was the owner of
the "suspect truck" or the tools in it.
Although the affidavit contains substantial information, the most important aspect thereof is what the affidavit
does not contain.

There is no indication that anyone had seen

any controlled substance on the premises.

There is no informa-

tion that any controlled substance had been purchased at the
residence.

There is no allegation that the U-Haul truck ever

contained marijuana or that the police attempted to follow the
truck to see where it went and whether or not it was ever
loaded or unloaded.
was being committed.

The police had no information that a crime
The officer's conclusibnary paragraph as

to what all the items observed could be used for could apply
just as easily to tomatoes, flowers, mushrooms or other legal
indoor cultivation, as well as to the growing of marijuana and
illegal mushrooms.
Other courts have been presented wit^h similar innocuous
facts and have held that probable cause did not exist.
instance, in People v. Remers, 470 P.2d

11

For

(Cal. 1970) the

California Supreme Court, in the course of defining probable
cause, stated:
"Where the events are as consistent with
innocent activity as with criminal activity,
a detention based on these events [is
unlawful: [citation ommitted] a fortiori,
an arrest and search based on events as
consistent with innocent activity as with
criminal activity is unlawful. _I<3. at 13.
(emphasis added)

17

In State v. McPherson, 698 P.2d 563 (Wash. App. 1985),
the court

applied

the principle that

innocent

activity

would

not support a finding of probable cause to a factual situation
similar to the present.

In that case the police received an

anonymous tip that the defendant was growing and selling marijuana.

The police observed black plastic covering the garage

windows, condensation
up.

on the windows, and potting

soil piled

A power use printout from the electric company indicated a

two to threefold

increase in power consumption beginning when

the defendant moved in.

In finding that the search warrant was

issued without

cause, the

probable

court made

the

relevant comments:
. . . If the informant's information does
not satisfy this test, [Aguilar-Spinelli, ]
probable cause can still be established if
independent police work sufficiently
corroborates the informant.
The anonymous tip was insufficient to
establish probable cause because there was
no showing that the caller was honest or
his information reliable, or that he obtained the information in a reliable manner.
Moreover, the information contained in the
affidavit for the search warrant did not
point to criminal activity, suspicious
activity or any activity at all. Everything
that was observed by Detective Oswald was
commonplace, consistent with normal behavior.
The independent police investigations
should point to suspicious activity,
probative indications of criminal activity
along the lines suggested by the informant.
Merely verifying 'innocuous details',
commonly known facts or easily predictable
events should not suffice to remedy a
deficiency in either the basis of knowledge
or veracity prong. _Id. at 562.
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following

In addressing

the increased use of electricity, the

court observed:
. . • such a sharp increase in electrical
use in an ordinary residence is somewhat
unusual but there are too many other
plausible explanations for the increased
energy use for that information to point to
criminal activity. Jx3. at 564.
Similarly, State v. Higby, 613 P.2d

1192 (Wash App.

1980) involved a search warrant issued for marijuana at a residence where

two

marijuana two

informants

weeks

told

earlier.

police

The

they

police

had

purchased

subsequently,

on

"several occasions", observed a considerable amount of vehicular
traffic and

pedestrians

three minutes.
of the day".

visiting

the

Higby home

for

two

or

The police observations were made "at all hours
In the affidavit the officer

stated

that this

behavior was inconsistent with what would be generally considered
ordinary visits.

The court, in finding there was no probable

cause, made the following observations which are pertinent to
the issues in this case:
. . . It is not enough, however, to set
forth that criminal activity occurred at
some prior time. The facts or circumstances
must support the reasonable probability
that the criminal activity was occurring at
or about the time the warrant was issued.
R5. at 1194
When the informant is an ordinary citizen,
as opposed to the criminal or professional
informant, and his identity is revealed to
the issuing magistrate, intrinsic indicia
of the informant's reliability may be found
in his detailed description of the underlying circumstances of the crime observed or
about which he had knowledge.
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The only other information discussed in
the affidavit was the reference to 'considerable1 traffic at the Higby residence.
The affidavit did not indicate the number,
time and date of the visits.
Although
search warrant affidavits are not read
hypertechnically, they must disclose sufficient facts to allow the magistrate to
exercise independent judgment on the question of probable cause. [citations omitted]
The officer's statement that the visits
were 'inconsistent with what would be
generally considered ordinary visits', is
simply a conclusion without sufficient
facts to support a similar, but independent,
judgment by the magistrate'. Jj3. at 1195.
(emphasis added)
In light of the case law cited above and the facts
set forth

in the

affidavit,

it is

clear

that

the

affidavit

fails to establish probable cause to support the warrant.
fact McPherson and Higby are dispositive.

In

Both cases involved

observations of activity which were as consistent with innocent
activity as with criminal activity.
factor present

However, there is a critical

in McPherson and Higby which is lacking in the

present situation.

In

information that

crime

a

each
had

of

those

actually

cases,
been

the police had
committed,

i.e.,

that marijuana was in fact being sold or grown on the subject
premises.

In the instant case, neither the "neighbor" infor-

mants, nor the surveillance officers observed the commission or
indication of any crime.

Therefore, "more and better evidence

is needed to prove that probable cause exists".

That

"better

evidence" is lacking in the present situation.
In Anderson, supra, this court sustained an affidavit
which when:
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viewed in its entirety and in a common-sense
fashion, sets forth sufficient underlying
circumstances to support the reliability
and credibility of the informant and the
conclusions of the affiant. (emphasis
added) 701 P.2d at 1102.
In the

instant

case,

the

affidavit

is

simply

a

collection of separate and innocuous facts that do not support
the reliability of the informants.

It especially does nothing

to support the conclusions of the affiant because they are so
speculative.
or the

Thus, under either the old Aguilar-Spinelli test

"totality

of

the

circumstances"

Gates, probable cause was lacking here.
should be suppressed

test

enunciated

in

Therefore, the evidence

pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I r Section 14 of the Utah
State Constitution.
innocuous facts

The affidavit is simply a, conglomeration of

which

may

arguably

suspicion but not the probable

establish

an

articulable

cause required by the federal

or state constitutions.
POINT II
THE AFFIANT MADE FALSE STATEMENTS IN THE
AFFIDAVIT KNOWINGLY OR WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE TRUTH. WHEN THESE FAJ^SE
STATEMENTS ARE REMOVED FROM THE AFFIDAVIT,
THE REMAINING. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES FAIL
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE.
As the

Fourth

Amendment

and

Article

If

Section 14

of the Utah Constitution explicitly require, no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
This oath or affirmation is typically the affidavit executed by
the searching officer:
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While at one time it could be accurately
said that the prevailing view was that a
defendant could not dispute the truthfulness
of matters appearing in a supportive
affidavit, more and more courts came to
accept the contrary conclusion.
LaFave,
Search & Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth
Amendment, §4.4(a) p.57 (1986 supplement)
In Franks v. Delaware, 438

U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct.

1674

(1978), the Supreme Court held that:
Where the defendant makes a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included
by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,
and if the allegedly false statement is
necessary to the finding of probable cause,
the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing
be held at the defendant's request. In the
event that at that hearing the allegeation
of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance
of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's
false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to
establish probable cause, the search warrant
must be voided and the fruits of the search
excluded to the same extent as if probable
cause was lacking on the fact of the affidavit.
This same logic applies to material ommissions on the part of
the affiant which would
determination.

otherwise influence a probable

cause

United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1486

n.l (9th Cir. 1985)
Since the

affidavit

contains

false

and

misleading

information thereby satisfying the requirements of Franks, then
as a matter of federal law, "the search warrant must be voided
and the fruits of the

search excluded".

affidavit, the following statement is made:
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On page two of the

A traffic survey of the area identified
several cars for which ownership records
identified a known drug user coming and
going from the premises in the early morning
hours. These vehicles stay only a short
time and then leave,
j
Appellant submits that this statement

is false and misleading

in that it implies that several cars were identified as belonging
to known drug users.

This statement was made with the knowledge

that only one car was owned by a person who had been arrested
for possession

of drug paraphernalia.

forth in the affidavit.
"known drug

user"

This fact was not set

The allegation that the person was a

is an unsupported

conclusion

and was made

with the knowledge that the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia had been dismissed.

(Tr. 11)

!

On page two of the affidavit, Officer Smith states:
The suspect Allen B. Miller has prior
illegal possession charges for possession
of psilacybin mushrooms, 1/4 pound, and
possession of marijuana.
Franklin David
Spain of the same address has also been
arrested for possession of marijuana in the
last year.
Appellant was charged with possession of marijuana on May 12,
1984 in Kane County.
of mushrooms or

He has never been charged with possession

1/4 pound

indication as to the

of anything.

source

of his

The affiant gave no

information,

but had he

checked the court records, he would have found that appellant
was charged

with possession

of marijuana and that the charge

was eventually dismissed without an adjudication of guilt.
Officer Smith then states in the affidavit that:
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Franklin David Spain of the same address [as
that of the appellant] has also been arrested
for possession of marijuana in the last
year.
However, in a report containing information gathered
before the issuance of the search warrant, Officer Smith stated
that Mr.

Spain's

California.

address

(Defendant's

was

1140

Exhibit

Virginia

4)

(Tr. 8)

Way,

Barstow,

Officer

Smith

listed appellant's address as that of Mr. Spain based upon an
arrest report prepared

after Mr. Spain was arrested one year

prior to preparation of the affidavit.

(Tr. 9, 10)

During his

six weeks of surveillance, Officer Smith never saw Mr. Spain at
appellant's home, (Tr. 9) yet he included a statement to that
effect in the affidavit.
On page two of the affidavit, in the final paragraph,
Officer Smith states:
...and the truck [would be] used to load
shipments for periodic distribution or
final cultivation of plants at another
growing site.
This statement is not only an unsupported

conclusion, but was

misleading in that Officer Smith neglected to include the fact
that the police had observed the contents of the U-Haul truck.
The contents consisted of peatmoss, vermiculite soil conditioner
and other

soil

expanders,

investigation report.

as

set

forth

in

Officer

(Defendant's Exhibit 4)

On page two, final paragraph, affiant states:
...Credit report shows suspect Miller selfemployed with Miller's Auto Body Shop,
which does not seem to exist.
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Smith's

Nowhere in the affidavit does Officer Smith Identify a source
or basis for this statement.
affidavit, one a copy
records, which

There are two attachments to the

of appellant's Utah Power

indicate

that

Miller's Automotive Paints.

appellant

is

& Light Co.

self-employed

The second attachment

by

is a hand-

written document by Officer Smith, with no showing of it being
fn

under oath, containing several statements.

this attachment

Officer Smith states:
Through checking of business license and
Bell Telephone listings, no record of a
Miller's Auto Body and Paints h^s been
found in Salt Lake County.
This statement is false in that appellant never stated that he
was employed by "Miller's Auto Body Shop" and it is misleading
in that

it tends to

when read

in

infer that defendant

connection

with

the

is untruthful

balance

of

the

and,

affidavit,

infers that appellant had no source of income and, therefore, must
have been selling drugs.

The statement was made knowingly or

with a reckless disregard for the truth in view of the information Officer Smith had from Utah Power & Light Co.
The facts
fail to
of the

establish
affidavit

stated
probable

are

in the affidavit, standing
cause.

removed,

the

When
State

the

infirm

cannot

alone,

portions

conceivably

claim that the remaining provisions establish probable cause.
Therefore, the

warrant

is

invalid

and

the

evidence

seized

should have been suppressed.
Even if

this

court

should

find

that

the

remaining

portions of the affidavit establish probable cause under federal

25

law, appellant

submits

that

the

misconduct

of

the

affiant

officer renders the affidavit invalid under Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution.
In State v. Nielson, 43 Utah Adv.Rpt. 13 (Utah 1986),
this court had the opportunity to apply Franks to an affidavit
wherein the affiant officer intentionally made misstatements of
fact.

The court went on to holdf based upon those particular

facts, that

the

misstatements

magistrates finding

did

of probable

not

cause.

materially

effect

the

Therefore, the court

found that, as a matter of federal law, the warrant and subsequent
search had to be sustained.

The defendant in that case did not

argue that the warrant and search were in violation of the Utah
Constitution.

In this regard the court stated:

Our upholding of the warrant under federal
law should not be read as an endorsement
of [the affiant's] conduct or as a determination of how the issue might be resolved
under the Utah Constitution. As this case
illustrates, the federal law as it has
developed since Franks v. Deleware is not
entirely adequate.
There is no stronger
argument for developing adequate remedies
for violations of the state and federal
constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable
searches and seizures than the example of a
police officer deliberately lying under
oath in order to obtain a search warrant.
See S. Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant
Affidavits as a Ground for Suppressing
Evidence, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 825, 831 (1971).
To allow a police officer to obtain a warrant
utilizing false information tends to undermine respect for the legal system and to
make the public cynical about the honesty
and professionalism of those entrusted with
law enforcement.
As one commentator has
observed, however, "[e]ven though warrants
issued on the basis of police perjury and
warrants issued without probable cause are
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equally reprehensible, they are not equally
unconstitutional..•. Under Franks, evidence
is to be excluded if, inter alia, the
culpability of the affiant-officer destroyed
probable cause," but warrants based on
perjury may be constitutional if probable
cause otherwise exists. Comment, Franks v.
Deleware; Granting the Right to Challenge
the Veracity of Search Warrant Affidavits,
45 Brooklyn L. Rev. 391, 405 (Winter 1979).
Our decision about what the appropriate
remedy might be if Nielsen had argued that
the officer's action violated his rights
under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution is an open question.
This
court has not decided whether an immaterial,
intentional misstatement in an affidavit
supporting a warrant requires suppression
of the evidence as a matter of Utah law or
whether it may give rise to some civil
cause of action. It is worth noting,
however, that the Utah Legislature has
enacted a statute which provides a remedy
for search and seizure violations under the
Utah Constitution. See Utah Code Annotated,
1953, §78-16-1 to 11 (Repl. Vol. 9A, 1977
ed., Supp. 1985). In addition, the police
officer may be liable for damages under the
provisions of the federal Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982).
Cf. Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S.
, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (March
5, 1986). Id_. at 15, 16. (emphasis added)
It is time

for this court

to fill the gap

federal law created by Franks v. Deleware, supra.

in the

If the court

should find that the affidavit establishes propable cause even
without the

deleted

false

statements,

then

as

a matter

of

public policy and state law, this affidavit: should be invalidated.

If the actions of Officer Smith are allowed to support

a finding of probable cause in this case, then this court would
render the search warrant "a mere charade, and the basic liberty
protected by

[Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution]
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would constitute an unenforceable right, or more realistically
statedf no right at all".

State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d at 1104.
POINT III

WHEN THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT PROBABLE
CAUSE WAS NOT IN FACT ESTABLISHED, THE
EVIDENCE SEIZED IS NOT OTHERWISE ADMISSIBLE
UNDER THE UTAH CODE OR UNDER THE LEON "GOOD
FAITH" EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
In United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct.

2405

(1984) the

United States Supreme Court concluded that "the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule should be modified

so as not to bar the use

in the prosecution's

of evidence

officers acting
issued by

in

case

in

reasonable

a detached

and

chief

reliance

on

neutral magistrate,

found to be unsupported by probable cause".
Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3409.

a

obtained

search
but

by

warrant

ultimately

United States v.

However, in reaching its decision the

court cautioned:
...Nevertheless, the officer's reliance on
the magistrate's probable cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of
the warrant that issues must be objectively
reasonable, and it is clear that in some
circumstances the officer will have no
reasonable grounds for believing that the
warrant was properly issued.
Suppression, therefore, remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in
issuing a warrant was misled by information
in the affidavit that the affiant knew was
false or would have known was false except
for his reckless disregard of the truth.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)...
Nor would an officer manifest objective
good faith in relying on a warrant based on
an affidavit so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render affiant's
belief in its existence unreasonable. Id.
at 421-22. (emphasis added)
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The facts set forth in the affidavit and the conduct of
Officer Smith have
repeated.

Those

been discussed

facts clearly

at length I and

establish

need

not be

two points.

First,

the affidavit was so lacking in factual information upon which to
support a finding of probable cause that Officer Smith's belief
that probable cause existed was objectively unreasonable.
Second, the false and misleading

information contained in the

affidavit exhibits a lack of good faith on the part of Officer
Smith, who was both the affiant and executing officer.

There-

fore, the state is not entitled to make use of the "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary

rule.

Smith is not that which the Supreme
promote.

The

conduct

of

Court in Leon

Officer

sought to

In fact, the proscription of this type of conduct is

the very basis

for the exclusionary

rule itself.

Therefore,

the Leon good faith exception is both inapplicable and inapproi

priate in the present situation.
POINT IV
THE UTAH FOURTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER BOTH THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH.
The Utah
and codify

State

its own good

legislature

has attempted

faith exception

to the

to create

exclusionary

rule in passing the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act, Utah Code
Annotated, §78-16-1, ejt. seq.

Section 78-16-5 thereof states:

No evidence which is otherwise competent
and admissible shall be excluded from any
criminal proceeding because of the violation
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of Fourth Amendment rights except evidence
whichf though otherwise admissible, was
secured in a method which involved a
substantial violation of Fourth Amendment
rights as provided in subsection 77-3512(g). J[d_. (emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated, §77-23-12 defines "substantial"
in the following manner:
Pursuant to the standards described in ^7735-12(g) property or evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant shall not be
suppressed at a motion, trial or other
proceeding unless the unlawful conduct of
the peace officer is shown to be substantial.
Any unlawful search or seizure shall be
considered substantial and in bad faith if
the warrant was obtained with malicious
purpose and without probable cause or was
executed maliciously and willfully beyond
the authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severity. Id_. (emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-12(g) states:
(1) In any motion concerning the admissibility of evidence or the suppression of
evidence pursuant to this section or at
trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and
seizure, the suppression of evidence shall
not be granted unless the court finds the
violation upon which it is based to be both
a substantial violation and not committed
in good faith. The court shall set forth
its reasoning for such finding.
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in
all cases be deemed substantial if one or
more of the following is established by the
defendant or applicant by a preponderance
of the evidence:
(i) The violation was grossly negligent,
willful, malicious, shocking to the conscious of the court or was a result of the
practice of law enforcement agency pursuant
to a general order of that agency;
(ii) The violation was intended only to
harass without legitimate law enforcement
purposes. Id.
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From these statutory provisions, it is clear that a
defendant roust prove that the constitutional violation was both
"substantial", i.e., grossly negligent, willful, malicious, or
shocking to the conscience of the court, and not committed in
good faith.

As defined in Utah Code Annotated, §76-2-103:

A person engages in conduct:
(1) . . .willfully with respect to the nature
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct,
when it is his conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect
to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he is aware
of but consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that its disregard constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise
under all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint. Id.
These are the burdensome elements which a defendant must prove
in order

to

suppress

Fourth Amendment.

evidence

obtained

in violation

of the

It is important to note that this Utah Act

explicitly applies only to the federal constitution, i.e., the
Fourth Amendment, and not to the Utah constitution.
The United

States

Supreme

Court has held

that the

Fourth Amendment only requires that a defendant prove that "the
officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit
or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in
the existence

of probable

cause" in order to avoid
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admission

under the

good

S.Ct. at 3410.
passed before
between the

faith

exception.

United States v. Leon,

104

Since the Fourth Amendment Enforcement Act was
Leon, there

Utah

State

is

bound

to

Legislature's

be

and

some
the

incongruence

United

States

Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and the
exclusionary rule.

However, as set forth above, the incongruence

is not slight because §77-35-12 defines good faith in a way which
does not comport at all, to Leon's good faith definition.
this reason, the

statute

violates

the

For

Fourth Amendment.

In

fact, the added burden place upon a defendant under the Utah
act goes far beyond that which is required by the federal constitution, as interpreted by Leon, and renders this statutory
framework unconstitutional

under

both

the

federal

and

state

constitutions.
If this court should find that the Utah act is in fact
constitutional, then appellant submits that the facts and circumstances of this case establish a violation of the §77-35-12,
et seq.

Officer

Smith's misstatements

in the affidavit

were

the product of gross negligence and/or made willfully or maliciously to misinform the court.
POINT V
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE DO
NOT JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF A "NO-KNOCK"
WARRANT.
On page three of the affidavit, the affiant requests
that the officer executing the warrant not be required to give
notice of his authority or purpose because: (1) physical harm may
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result to any person if notice were given; and (2) the property
sought may

be

quickly

(Defendant's Exhibit 1)

destroyed,

disposed

of,

or

secreted,

The affiant then states that he believes

"this danger existed", because:
Two large watch dogs are always present and
might pose a hazard to the arresting
officers.
Based on the statement, the search warrant contained the following direction from the magistrate:
You are therefore commanded:
To execute without notice of authority
or purpose, (proof under oath being shown
that the object of this search may be
quickly destroyed or disposed of or that
harm may result to any person if notice
were given ) .
|
Utah Code Annotated, §77-23-10(2) provides that such
a direction to the officer may only be inserted in a warrant:
..•upon proof, under oath, that the object
of the search may be quickly destroyed,
disposed of, or secreted, or that physical
harm may result to any person if notice
were given.
There is no evidence, other than the affiant1s
statement, unsupported

by the body of the affidavit, that the

police observed any dogs at the residence during the six week
surveillance.

Further,*there is no evidence or inference that

any dog on the premises had any propensity to be dangerous, or
how the affiant determined that the dogs were "watchdogs".
Evidence produced at the suppression hearing
that there were no dogs present on the premises

for

showed
several

weeks before the warrant was executed, and therefore, the state-
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ment of

the affiant was

false.

Additionally,

it would

seem

that physical harm would be more likely to occur with an unannounced, armed entry into the house, with dogs present.
In State of Washington v. Jeter, 634 P.2d 312 (1981),
the court

addressed

necessary to

sustain

the
a

issue
"no

of

knock"

what

circumstances

warrant, under

a

were

statute

similar to Utah's:
. . .In order to justify the search of premises
without police first announcing their
presence, the State must demonstrate the
existence of exigent circumstances. Exigent
circumstances include a genuine concern for
police safety and a belief that contraband
will be destroyed, as was asserted in the
present case. However, such exigent
circumstances must be based upon specific
facts learned prior to execution of the
warrant or observed at the scene, in contrast
to a generalized speculation by law
enforcement officers that their safety may
be endangered or contraband destroyed.
In the present case the trial courts1
finding of exigent circumstances was based
upon a belief tha defendant could destroy
the contraband and a concern for police
safety based on ... information that
defendant kept a weapon. Neither provides
a sufficient factual basis to rise to the
level of exigent circumstances. A belief
that contraband will be destroyed must be
based upon sounds or activities observed at
the scene or prior specific knowledge that
a particular suspect has a propensity to
destroy contraband.
Likewise, a concern for police safety must
be based upon prior knowledge or direct
observation that the subject of the search
keeps weapons and that such a person has a
known propensity to use them.
(citation
ommitted) at 314.
There was no basis for a "no notice" provision to be
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inserted in the warrant.
executed in violation

Therefore, the warrant was issued and

of

the

statute

right to be free from unreasonable

and

the

constitutional

searches and the evidence

seized should have been suppressed.
POINT VI
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT THE MATERIAL SEIZED FROM
APPELLANTfS RESIDENCE WAS IN FACT MARIJUANA.
As already

stated

herein, the State produced

three

witnesses at trial in order to establish that the plant material
was marijuana.
smelled what

Officer

he

Smith testified that he observed

believed

to

be marijuana.

(R.

219)

and

Kevin

Smith testified that he examined the substance microscopically
and performed

the

Duquenois-Levine

chemical

test.

(R.

228)

Based upon these tests, Kevin Smith concluded that the plants
were marijuana.

Finally, the state called Robert Brinkman to

testify as to the pertinent

industry standards.

This was the

only evidence presented by the State.
Although the case law on the subject is scant, there
is one

case

which

State v. Vail, 274

is dispositive
N.W.2d

127

of

(Minn.

the present

issue.

1979),

court

the

In
held

that a microscopic examination, the Duquenois-Levine test, and
a thin layer chromatography test were insufficient to establish
the fact that the

substance before that court was marijuana.

In reaching its decision, the court heard the testimony of the
arresting officers, a state criminalist and the expert testimony
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of Dr.

Marc

G.

Kurzman,

who

was

the

attorney

representing

appellant at trial.
In the present

situation,

it is important

to

note

that Kevin Smith performed only two of the three tests used in
Vail.

In

fact, appellant, through

the state's

witnesses

and

direct

the

cross examination

examination

Fullerton, a professor at Oregon

of

State University

Dr.

of

Dwight

College of

Pharmacy and who specializes in plant identification, (R. 254,
255) established the fact that the two tests employed by Kevin
Smith are

not

scientifically

effective

in

identifying

mari-

juana.
Kevin Smith, who has never had any botanical training
(R. 235), testified

that

that the plant material
cell hairs.

(R. 234)

his microscopic
contained

chemical substances
239)

showed

cystolith and long, single

However, these same hairs are found on

hundreds of different plants.
the Duquenors-Levine

examination

test,
could

(R. 235, 261)

Kevin
react

Smith

With regard to

admitted

similarly

that

other

to marijuana.

(R.

However, Kevin Smith only visually checked to see if any

such reactants were located on the plant material.
One of the most effective ways of identifying marijuana
is through the use of mass spectroscopy.

(R. 270)

This is an

infrared procedure which specifically identifies those chemicals
which are

unique

to marijuana.

(R.

271, 272)

Kevin

Smith

testified that he had this procedure available to him, that the
spectrometry method

is

used

in
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identifying

most

controlled

substances, but in the present situation, he did not use the
equipment to form his conclusion.

(R. 232, 233)

Therefore, because Kevin Smith failed to follow proper
procedures to

insure

that reactants were

plant, which could have caused

not present

on the

it to react positively to the

Duquenois-Levine test, and because he failed to use the spectrometry equipment which would have proven beyond a reasonable
doubt whether the material was marijuana, the state failed to
meet its

burden

of

proof.

Dispositive

is

Dr.

Fullerton's

statement that, had he been present with thej evidence produced
by the State, he would not be able to conclude that the plant
material was marijuana with any reasonable degree of scientific
certainty.

(R. 268, 269)
CONCLUSION
Based on the

that the

evidence

residence should

foregoing arguments, appellant

seized

as a

be ordered

appellant requests

this

result

of the

suppressed.

court

to

order

search

submits
of his

In the alternative,
this

case

dismissed

because the State failed to prove the existejnce of a controlled
substance beyond a reasonable doubt.
Dated this

day of January, 1987.

RONALD J. YENGICH

EARL XAIZ
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing were mailed/delivered

to the Attorney Generalfs

Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114,
on this

day of January, 1987.
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ADDENDUM
§77-35-12(g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended:
(g)(1) In any motion concerning the admissibility of the
evidence or the suppression of evidence pursuant to this section
or at trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the
suppression of evidence shall not be granted unless the court
finds the violation upon which it is based to be both a
substantial violation and not committed in good faith. The
court shall set forth its reasons for such finding.
(2) An unlawful serach or seizure shall in all cases
be deemed substantial if one or more of the following is
established by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of
the evidence:
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, willful,
malicious, shocking to the conscience of the court or was a
result of the practice of the law enforcement agency pursuant
to a general order of that agency;
(ii) The violation was intended
without legitimate law enforcement purposes.

only

to harass

(3) In determining whether a peace officer was acting
in good faith under this section, the court shall consider, in
addition to any other relevant factors, some or all of the
following:
(i) The extent of deviation from legal search and
seizure standards;
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will tend to
deter future violations of search and seizure standards;
(iii) Whether or not the officer was proceeding
by way of a search warrant, arrest warrant, or relying on
previous specific directions of a magistrate or prosecutor;
or
(iv)

The extent to which privacy was invaded.

(4) If the defendant or applicant establishes that the
search or seizure was unlawful and substantial by a preponderance
of the evidence, the peace officer or governmental agency must
then, by a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good faith
actions of the peace officer.

L. "TED" CANNON
inty
Attorney
' MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN
yjty County
Attorney
irtside
Office
Building
I East 400 South,
3rd
Floor
It Lake City,
Utah
84111
one:
(801)
363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

"ATE OF UTAH

)
SS

) :

>unty

of

Salt

Lake

)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH' WARRANT

SFORE:

450 South
JUDGE

he undersigned
hat

he has

hat

(X)

n the
ertain

affiant

on the

being

to

first

said

premises

West Jordan,
or evidence

(X)
(X)
(X)
(X)

Affiant
crime(s)

property

duly

sworn,

7889

South

deposes

and

says:

believe
known as

County of Salt
Lake,
described
as:

larijuana
plants
and/or
mushrooms in
cultivating
paraphernalia,
packaging
x>tting
soil
and containers
and bank
ind zhat

East

ADDRESS

reason

City
of
property

200

or

3850

West,

State

of

West

Jordan,

Utah,

there

various
stages
of cultivation,
materials,
ledgers,
drying
receipts

is

now

grow
equipment,

lights,
seeds,

evidence:

was unlawfully
acquired
or is unlawfully
possessed;
has been used to commit or conceal
a public
offense;
is being possessed
with the purpose
to use it as a means
committing
or concealing
a public
offense;
consists
of an item or constitutes
evidence
of illegal
possessed
by a party
to the illegal
conduct;

believes
the
of Cultivation

Utah

property
and evidence
and Possession
of

described
Controlled

above is evidence
Substance.

of
conduct,

of

the

PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The facts

to establish

the grounds

CAU^LJL

Q ^
for

issuance

of a Search

•

>U^U,

Warrant

are:

A^ilS^
^

On June 14, 1985, upon receipt
of complaints
of unusual traffic
in the
neighborhood
of suspect
premises by neighbors,
affiant
and other
members
of the State of Utah Narcotics
and Liquor Law Enforcement
began
investigation and surveillance
of said suspect
premises.
In plain view
observation
of premises
affiant
observed and photographed
the residence
showing
three
large steel
storage
sheds to rear; two swamp coolers
that blow
continually
and empty into boarded up and bermed basement area; a furnace
like
apparatus
with two large vent stacks
are seen in garage area where windows
are also boarded up, but are visible
from roof line and when side
door
is open; a series
of lights
commonly used for grow lights
were
observed
and photographed
on swamp cooler;
and neighbors
have observed
occupants
of residence
mixing up peat moss although
the yard has never been cared
for or cultivated
in any fashion.
A traffic
survey of the area
identified
several
cars for which ownership records identified
a known drug user
coming and going from the premises
in the early morning hours.
These
vehicles
stay only a short time then
leave.
On numerous occasions
a U-Haul truck has been located
to the rear of
the garage and neighbors
have heard loading
and unloading
from the
side
door which is not as readily
observable
as the front garage door.
This
loading
seems to occur at odd hours late at night.
Neighbors have
never
seen the large garage door open.
Neighbors
reported
seeing two large
dogs with occupants
when they were mixing peat moss, but most of the
time the dogs remain
inside.
Contact with Utah Power and Light showed service
lines
coming into
the
home three times larger than required
of that size residence.
Monthly
power consumption
four to five times in excess of normal, with one
bill
for $2,Y00.00J/which
suspect
paid when meter reader came to read the
meter.
Utah Power and Light has been denied access to meter by Miller and has
paid any bill
without
contest.
The suspect,
Allen B. Miller has
prior
illegal
possession
charges for possession
of psilacybin
mushrooms,
1/4
pound and possession
of marijuana.
Franklin
David Spain of the same
address has also been arrested
for possession
of marijuana in the
last
year.
Miller
according
to neighbors
acts very secretive
when observed
around
premises.
Affiant,
a trained
narcotics
officer
knows that peat moss is used for
growing marijuana
and mushrooms and has observed numerous stacks
of
plastic
buckets
at the residence,
knows that furnaces
can be used to
dry plants
for useage, and that swamp coolers
can vent and humify
plants
being grown in a basement as at suspect
premises.
Large
electrical
consumption
would be used to facilitate
grow lights
and drying
equipment;
and the truck used to load shipments
for periodic
distribution
or
final
cultivation
of plants
at another growing site.
Credit report
shows
suspect
Miller
self-employed
with Miller's
autobody shop which does not
seem to exist.
Suspect
truck observed
at residence
never has
tools
in i t .
Surveillance
termination
1200 hours, August 1, 1985.

t

•

PAGE THREE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Your affiant
considers
the information
received
from the
confidential
informant
reliable
because
(if any information
is obtained
from an unnamed
source.1) .
Neighbors
are private
citizens
whose reports
have been
observed
and verified
by affiant
and photographed.
Photographs
are presented
to
magistrate
as part of probable
cause
statement.
Your affiant
has verified
the above information
from the
informant
to be correct
and accurate
through
the following
investigation:
continuous
surveillance
from June 14, 1985
1985 in which traffic
survey
and photographic
surveillance,
investigations
confirmed
neighbor9s
reports.
WHEREFORE: the affiant
of said
items:
(X)

(x)

This

danger

Two large
arresting

is

that

a Search

Warrant

be issued

for

the

seizure

at any time day or night
because
there
is reason
to
believe
i t is necessary
to seize
the property
prior
to it
being
concealed,
destroyed,
damaged,
or altered,
or for other
•
good reasons,
to-wit:

It is further
requested
requested
warrant
not
or purpose
because:
(X)

prays

confidential
idenpendent
to August
1,
and
background

that
(if
be required

appropriate)
the officer
to give notice
of the

executing
officer's

the
authDrity

physical
harm may result
to any person
if notice
were
or
the property
sought
may be quickly
destroyed,
disposed
secreted.
believed

watch dogs
officers.

to
are

exist

always

because:
present

and might

pose

a hazard

to

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME thi
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PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
to make a search of the alcove-named
above described
property
or evidence

or described
premises
for the
hereinand if you find the same or any part

thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth Circuit Court, County
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody,
subject
to the order of this
court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated
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